





Rather than appearing as the prerogative of the sovereign State,
concerns about conduct are voiced and pursued by a multiplicity
of authorities and agencies that seek to unify, divide, make whole
and fragment, our selves and our lives in the name of specific
forms of truth.
Mitchell Dean (1996:210-1 I)
Audit and inspection...constitute the conduct of politics by other
means, a characteristic they share with war.
Michael Power (1999:67)
In the early 1990s journalists, economists, social scientists and spin-
doctors began to focus on 'globalisation' as defining a new age in socio-
economic development (Therborn, 2000: 149).1 For the Right, it stood for
a brave new world then emerging, one which junked trade barriers and
obstructive regulation based on nation-states. The original, early-
nineteenth century economic-liberal utopia of unfettered market
operations - a libertarian and individualistic vision splendid - was at
long last about to be realised globally. At the same time the Right
extolled globalisation in terms of its traditional, quasi-theological
apologia for markets as such: they're irresistible, they're natural, and
The tenn itself predates the 1990s, but became common coinage only from that
decade, Naturally, globalisation has a history, often traced back to the 18705, one
which is the object of today's interest in 'transnational history' (eg Boli and
Thomas, 1999; lriye and'Saunier, forthcoming)
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they're good for everybody, just as Adam Smith (1937) wrote in 1776.
The market's benign, optimising 'invisible hand' sees to all that. This
time around technological detenninism braces the argument - the
invisible hand now has its fingers glued to keyboards connected to the
microchips of the world.
For much of the Left, globalisation stood for a new onslaught by
plutocrats everywhere (aka 'market forces') against democratic will
fonnation in the 'fonn of nation-states' socio-economic developmental
choices, and hence the destruction of socio-economic security and social
equity on a world scale. The Left challenged the mythification of market
forces as natural, irresistible and benevolent. It pointed to the actual
origins of globalisation in the policies of powerful nation-states in which
neo-liberals held the reins of power, and to the increasingly skewed
distribution of wealth, income, life chances, and other elements of social
development that globalisation palpably generates.
Both sides shared the assumption that international markets and their
powerful players were winning a zero-sum game against nation-states for
mastery over socio-economic development (and regression) around the
world. This essentialist scenario had no place for institutional,
organisational and governmental dynamics. Later problematisations of
globalisation - by sceptics who questioned the basic premise of a
profound change towards global economy (for instance Weiss, 1998),
and by anti-globalisation theorists and activists - has led researchers to
look more carefully at how globalisation actually works.
The globalised world, it now seems, is coordinated and held together not
only by markets, but also by a cornucopia of transnational organisations
and other bureaucracies (including corporations) which compete with
each other on an international market in rules and regulatory regimes of
bewildering variety. In fact, Ahrne and Brunsson (2004) point to a 'rule
explosion'. According to one well-kJ;1own thesis, globalisation rests on
big bureaucracies (often corporate ones), markets, and a prominent kind
of rule-setting - fannal international standards (Brunsson, 2000:21). The
latter long predate globalisation, but have now assumed a new and
qualitatively greater role that exemplifies this condition.
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Two curiosities arise from this less essentialist view of globalisation.
Firstly, the globalised world's growing number of supporting
transnational organisations (or 'international non-governmental
organisations' - ingos), such as the International Organization of
Standardization (ISO), exercise neither the delegated authority of
sovereign states nor financial muscle, and must therefore generate
alternative sources of authority for themselves and the rules they set and
sell on a competitive market (Tamm Hallstrom, 2004).2 Just as - in the
wake of the French Revolution - political legitimacy rests on popular
sovereignty and therefore representative processes, so transnational
organisations have to make out some sort of claim to 'represent' a variety
of 'stakeholders', including fictive 'communities', such as 'consumers'
and 'environmentalists',
Secondly, the market in rules has in turn summoned forth an even more
rapidly expanding market in auditing, certification and accreditation
based on those rules, Instead of the old economic-liberal fantasy of
deregulation, we now have this 'new regulation'.3 Deregulation is only
'visible' to the eye blinded by the essentialist assumption that regulation
is something that sovereign states alone do, Far from being the promised
land of hairy-chested individualism and 'freedom', the globalised world
now bristles with overlapping and competing regulatory regimes, and
supports a vast global army of surveillance and conformance neo-
professionals popularly known as (financial and non-financial) auditors.
One of this army's generals, Michael Power (1999, 2005), has theorised
current arrangements as the audit society.
These lines of inquiry leave little doubt that globalisation represents,
among other things, another configuration of power relationships. In
other words, it stands for just another metamorphosis of Herrschafi - to
doff our caps to the classical theorist of power in the modem world, Max
Weber, who called domination and subordination by their true names.
2 Trnnsnational bodies do not arise out of treaty between nation-states. Rather, most
of them are self-genernting ingos, the numbers of which have been rising steeply
in recent years: see Boli and Thomas 1999: Part One.
3 This is the title of a large and ongoing research project at the Stockholm Centre for
Organisational Research (SCORE), for which visit www.score.su.se.
-----------------------~
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In this paper I will seek to indicate what is different about the way power
is organised, and thus exercised, in the globalised world; that is, how we
are governed. Weber (1978) himself analysed markets in power tenns, in
stark contrast to mainstream economists' and other apologetic accounts
which present them as fields of 'natural' human interaction which are
innocent of th~t nasty substance. In Weberian tenns, the unequal
outcomes of market operations simply follow the uneven distribution of
power that markets generate and articulate. From this perspective, we
need to inquire into how power (including market power) is organised
now.
In the next section I will look at the transnational organisational scene
itself - with special reference to the main global standardiser and
paradigmatic transnational organisation, IS04 - before interpreting 'the
new regulation' in tenns of Michel Foucault's analysis of variations in
governmental rationality in modem times. Finally, I will look at the
implications for political contestation of how globalisation is organised.
New Regulation, New Iron Cage
In a recent paper, Marie-Laure Djelic and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson
(2005) have provided an overview of the dynamics producing the new
regulation in what they call our 'transnationalising world' - a
fonnulation they prefer to 'globalisation'. They confmn Levi-Faur and
Jordana's (2005) characterisation of the present as a new 'golden era of
regulation'. Nation-states now either cooperate with 'voluntary'
transnational organisations, or have made way for the latter's 'soft' law
(recommendations, nonns and standards) and regulation, while reserving
the right to return and impose their 'hard' equivalents if the new
regulation falls short (Morth, 2005). The most powerful nation-state of
them all, the USA, so overshadows the new regulation through such
relays as the IMF, World Bank, UN, WTO and their instrumentalities
4 In Loya and Boli's (1999: 176-77) estimate. this organisation attracts around 30
000 expens onto its standards-developing technical committees. and is
functionally linked to another 450 transnational organisations. These authors'
account presents it in more idealistic tenns than I do.
GLOBALlSATION AND NEO-L1BERAL RULE 9
that, to a large extent, the new regulation amounts to Americanisation.
'The institutional forces, the fundamental rules of the game of the rule-
making process in our world also reflect undeniably the power of
American actors, groups, networks, organizations and cultural and
cognitiv~ blueprints,' Djelic and SaWin-Andersson (2005:35) argue.
In the space thus created for transnational regulation, we can easily get
the impression of instability and disorder from the exorbitant growth of
regulatory frameworks ('regulatory or governance "inflation"'), the
competitive jostling of rule-setting organisations, and 'complex patterns
of bricolage' (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2005:8, 10). All this, our
authors suggest, represents surface phenomena. Beneath them,
corporations and other organised interests are competing for power and
control over their particular socio-economic fields. Four kinds of
organisational actor dominate the competition among rule-setters - those
that are part of or associated with nation-states; 'public' international
organisations (eg, IMF, World Bank, WTO, OECD and various
manifestations of the Ell); 'reinvented old actors' (eg, universities,
corporations, the media and the professions); and 'new' actors - either
entirely new, or old ones, such as standards bodies, which have newly
arrived on the regulatory stage (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2005:24-
25).
The way for any organised interest to win in this new game is not to try
to evade regulation, but on the contrary to take the lead in setting up a
regulatory regime that gives one's own interests an adv-"ntage - the 'first-
mover advantage'. We might call this strategy pre-emptive regulatory
capture. As more and more interests adopt it, areas of socio-economic
activity that have traditionally not been regulated now fall under the spell
of transnational regulation, such as aspects of fmancial reporting, quality
management, environmental management and social responsibility.
Naturally, the new regulation promotes a discourse that suppresses
references to the effective strategic considerations (that is, power, control
and self-interest), and instead enshrines references to progress,
efficiency, best practice, science, expertise, professionalism, coordination
and the Common Good. Significantly, indulgence in this discourse (and
practices based on it) moulds i~entity. Now even nation-states refer to
themselves and their operations in these terms, as if they were also self-
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optimising corporations rather than the vehicles of the popular will and
responsible for the welfare of their national communities.
As Machiavelli himself suggested, struggles for power follow rules of the
game - 'meta-norms' in contemporary parlance - which structure the
contests and so provide an underlying order. An important meta-norm
today shifts responsibility away from rule-setters towards rule-followers.
This puts a premium on setting rules governing selfpresentation - above
all, establishing the organisational protocols whereby rule-followers
become formally auditable. Audit and subsequent certification then
become essential for an organisation's 'street cred'. The consequent
'audit explosion' in turn leads to a steep proliferation of administrative
work in all organisations so as to meet the demands of 'the paper police'
(Power, 1994; Ivarsson Westerberg, 2005). (This is a blight that
Australian academics, among the denizens of many other large
organisations, hardly need to be reminded of1)
The self-presentation element in the new regulation has its own discourse
featuring terms such as transparency and accountability, all devoid of
relevance to the substantive quality of the products or services that the
organisations in question produce. The practices that this discourse
spawns illustrate Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson's (2005:20, 29) point that
'transnationalising' regulation hardly nurtures diversity in organisational
life; rather, it promotes homogeneity, conformity and surveillance.
Weber's 'iron cage' of rationalised modem organisational forms looms
once more (to say nothing of Kafka's castle).
A potted history of international standardisation epitomises these trends
(see Higgins, 2005a; 2005b:3-10). Most national standards bodies
(NSBs) in the west began life in the 1920s to develop and publish
national standards. The latter fulfilled a strictly technical' role in
coordinating design, installation and industrial production so as to
promote national economic integration, (initialiy bilateral) trade, and
technology transfers. At first NSBs published mainly product standards.
By degrees they came to play a modest role in government regulation by
providing and continually updating technical specifications to
complement regulations and government purchasing. They played a key
part in technical innovation and technology transfers in the war effort
1939-45, a period that also saw the diffusion of quality control standards
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- process standards - in munitioJls industries. (Process or 'management'
standards address not what is produced, but rather the manner in which it
is produced.) In 1944 the Allied nation-states directed their NSBs to form
the United Nations Standards Coordinating Committee to facilitate
military technology transfers and exchanges of military hardware.
Two years later this body became the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), destined to grow four decades later into a key
participant in the new· transnational regulation. At first it merely
coordinated the NSBs' work by producing 'recommendations' as to how
compatible national standards might be developed. But from 1970 it
began to publish new-fangled 'international standards', which affiliate4
NSBs were invited to adopt unamended as 'harmonised' national
standards to facilitate trade. The Tokyo Round (1973-79) of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade developed the GATT Standards Code
(later superseded by the WTO equivalent) that reinforced the authority of
international standards as a means of reducing technical barriers to trade.
In 1987 ISO published its first significant process standards - the generic
ISO 9000 quality management series, and the new iron cage was thereby
under construction. Trade had by then intensified to the point where
many companies could no longer rely on their good reputations in the
local business culture, and had to seek remote trading partners. The latter
naturally needed evidence of their new partners' sound management. ISO
9000 appeared to meet that need.
Audit-verified certification to ISO 9000 in time became the essential
calling card for corporations and other organisations in many western
countries, and increasingly in east-central Europe and Asia. Not only did
ISO 9000 sell phenomenally wen, but a burgeoning industry grew up
around consultancy on how to apply it, and around audit, certification,
and accreditation of the certifiers. The once-modest technical committee
(ISO TC 176), that developed and still updates ISO 9000, became a
nodal point of transnational regulatory power. Criticisms of the series
were legion - it drew on pop-management literature rather than hard-
nosed management theory; it prescribed top-down control structures; it
excluded employee involvement; it hardly addressed substantive issues
of product and service quality; its generic nature assumed that one size
fits all - but 'the market' was not listening (Foley et ai, 2005).
---------------------------------------
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International process standards provided ISO with a promising start as a
transnational regulator, and it has gone on to develop several more, only
the more salient of which warrant mention here. Working on the ISO
9000 precedent, in 1996 it launched its series of environmental
management standards (ISO 14000). Again, audit and certification were
features of the system, which thus offered corporations the possibility of
a certified clean bill of health on environmental issues, as long as the
auditors ticked the right boxes. In 2003 it began to develop a standard for
social responsibility (ISO 26000, due in 2008), albeit on the promise -
which many treat with scepticism - that it will not be the object of audit
and certification.
In this context 'social responsibility' refers to an organisation's practices
in industrial relations, gender equity and north-south trade. ISO braved a
new level of controversy in this initiative. Lacking delegated authority
from one or a consortium of nation-states, it had to work hard on its
'quest for authority', as Kristina Tamm Hallstrom (2004) puts it, in the
eyes of its potential customers and rule-followers. Those who had long
occupied the field (especially the International Labour Organization and
the Global Reporting Initiative) protested, had to be mollified, and to
some extent brought into the developmental process, 'while business
interests had to be reassured that social responsibility would not cut into
profits. Others who intercepted this reassurance wondered if standards
development in this area wasn't yet another case of going through the
motions for cosmetic purposes, with little prospect of substantive sociill-
responsibility'outcomes'.5
ISO thus illustrates Djelic and Sahlin's argument in several ways. It
exemplifies an old actor playing an altogether new and salient role in 'the
new regulation', with its proliferation of rules (including norms and
formal standards), and its emphasis on self-presentation, and thus
reliance on frenetic auditing. It has constantly had to compete with other
transnational rule-setters for markets for its rules, and it has had to
generate its own authority (based on claims to representativeness and
procedural transparency in standards development) in the eyes of
5 For a good description of these controversies in the developmental process towards
ISO's coming social responsibility standard to date, see Tamm Hallslrom, 2005.
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potential rule-foIlowers. And part of the appeal of international standards
as 'soft' law is that they pre-empt authoritative 'hard' interventions by
nation-states.
One of Max Weber's less visited prophecies concerns the trend in
modem organisations towards formal rationality (accounting
conventions and other intemaIly consistent and self-referential
calculative systems) at the expense of substantive rationality (ends-
means rationality, or the most efficient way to achieve a given
substantive result) (Higgins and Clegg, 1988). It might be remembered
that he and Franz Katka (1883-1924) were contemporaries, both
prominent writers in the German-speaking world, observing the same
modem trends, and arguably coming to' similar conclusions.6 The new
transnational regulation embodies formal rationality and formalistic
rituals of checking in close to pure form.
Transnational regulators are not, it seems, in the business of building a
more efficient and fair world, just a more obsessively standardised,
regulated, administered, audited and certified one. So what is the point of
globalisation's new transnational regulation? Let us ask Michel Foucault.
Rationalities And Technologies Of Government
From the late 1970s until his death in 1984, Foucault broadened the
scope of his studies of specific forms of power - especiaIly disciplinary
power and bio-politics - into the development and proliferation of
governmental rationalities (and of practices dependent on them)
throughout the modem period in the west'? Government (cruciaIly
understood as an encompassing practice, and not as a particular
6 I owe this insight to my colleague Stewart Clegg. Weber's own dates are 1864-
1920.
7 The classic texts of Foucault's earlier period of power analysis are Discipline and
punish and The history ofsexuality vol. I; the brief canon on governmentality as
such took the form of Foucault's 1978 lecture of the same name to the College de
France (Foucault. 1991). The best ovelView of the area (including a handy
glossary of terms) is probably Dean. 1999, while Hindess. 1996 provides an
excellent reconciliation of Foucault's thought with mainstream western political
theory. .
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institution) in our own time thus has at its disposal a menu of
'technologies' that has accumulateg over the last four centuries. Rather
like the nodal jewels in Indra's net, each rationality in practice carries the
reflection of the others. Since Foucault's death, a whole school of
exegetes has systematised his fragmentary literary legacy in the area, and
in what folrows I will rely on their work.
For Foucault the story - or 'genealogy' - starts with the transition from
Machiavelli's problematic in The prince (how a ruler might gain and
retain control of a territory he has seized or otherwise acquired) to one
concerned with the government of a population (Foucault, 1991: I00).
Right from the start, 'government' itself was understood as a practice,
'the conduct of conduct', to be applied to a series of objects, from
oneself, through one's spouse, children, household and business, to the
social and political entities under one's sway. For instance, 17'h century
handbooks for rulers typically emphasised that good government began
with the ruler's own intimate practice of self-rule and self-control
(Foucault, 1991).
From this bedrock arose the first rationality of government in the series,
one known in the German states, where it a~ose in the 17th century, as
Polizeiwissenschajt (and sometimes 'cameralism': Pasquino, 1991). This
'police science', which relied heavily on statistics about the population,
had little to do with defending law and order - a connotation 'police'
acquired only in the late 18th century. Rather, it sought to submit the
population to the gaze of all-knowing authorities, including through
'statistics' and neo-stoicist confessional practices (forerunners of today's
rituals of self-presentation). The authorities could then intervene to
secure the prosperity of the state and the population (including through
mercantilist trading arrangements), and the happiness of the latter
understood as a body otherwise incapable of securing these boons for
itself. The triad government-population-security would henceforth
provide a constant trope in modem governmentality.
In the Foucauldian lexicon the 'police' conception of government is also
called 'the shepherd-flock game', as it constitutes the state as a political
pastorate that takes responsibility for the 'flock' as a whole, and for its
individual members. The ambit of 'pastoral' government knows no
bounds. The police regulations for the city of Nuremberg in the late
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middle ages, for instance, dealt w·ith such matters as the use of the
familiar second-person pronoun between parents and children, the
dimensions of saddles and horsecloths, what could be eaten and drunk at
weddings, and so on (Pasquino, 1991: 110).
At least in its original forms, 'pastoral' government depended on state
sovereignty and raison d'etat, but the remainder of the series of
governmental rationalities does not necessarily do so. Foucault is perhaps
best known for his study of the origins of 'disciplinary society', and for
the associated dethroning of state sovereignty - 'cutting off the king's
head' - as an important element in the exercise of government (Foucault,
1977; 1980:121). Disciplinary power does not proceed from a sovereign
at the centre of government, but is on the contrary 'capillary' - exercised
locally according to a variety of discursive techniques ('the micro-
physics of power') in particular 'private' and 'public' institutional
settings (Hoy, 1986:131).
To the extent that (governmental) power thus dispenses with reliance on
a doctrine of sovereignty, it can also dispense with the legitimacy and
authority that state sovereignty normally bestows on its institutional
expressions. From now on, the relationship between governmental
practices and state institutions is strictly contingent. Thus the divorce
between regulation and state sovereignty - such a defining characteristic
of the globalised new regulation - rests on longstanding precedents.
Nonetheless, disciplinary society, which began to emerge in the 17th
century, exhibits continuities with 'police science'. They include the
assumed knowability (through statistics and confeSSional techniques) of
the populations under its sway, themselves conceived very much as the
objects of rule in the form of surveillance, regimentation and control, as
'bodies' to be 'drilled' and 'normalised' in armies, prisons, poor- and
work-houses, among other paradigmatic settings. The very notion of
discipline harks back to government of the self in the pastoral conception
of government, as well as anticipating the 'practices of the self based on
self-mastery and self-responsibility that would later underpin liberal
rationalities ofgovernment.
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In the 19lh century an amalgam of pastoral and disciplinary power began
to crystallise, one Foucault calls 'bio-power' to designate, as eolin
Gordon (1991 :4-5) puts it,
forms of power exercised over persons specifically in so far as
they are thought of as living beings: a politics concerned with
subjects as members of a population, in which issues of
individual sexual and reproductive conduct interconnect with
other issues of national policy and power.
A by-product of the interest in the population from this point of view was
a certain collusion with another, otherwise antithetical rationality - early
(or classical) liberalism from the late 18th century. In both cases, the
population began to take on a new nomenclature and character as
'society'.
In spite of abjuring the earlier aspirations to omniscience in relation to
the governed, liberal strategies of government until recent times have
also relied heavily on 'statistics', and more particularly, social-scientific
.expertise. This expertise has often privileged economics (aka political
economy), but it has also included other. substantive expertise understood
as contained in sui generis disciplines such as public administration,
political science, sociology, epidemiology, social work and psychology.
These disciplines generated the know-how (saVOir-faire) which, when
fed into public inquiries and other policy-forming bodies, 'render docile
the unruly domains over which government is to be exercised, to make
government possible and to make government better,' in Nikolas Rose's
(1996:45) words.
In the classical liberal (but not the bio-political) perspective, society is
seen as having its own immanent regularities and processes of self-
regulation, which define the limits of institutional government, and
which have to be known if government is to be effective. Naturally, the
Foucauldian tradition accounts for liberalism not as an ideology· or
philosophy, but rather as a distinctive approach to the art of government,
one based on critique of the totalising pretensions and claims to
omniscience of pastoral and bio-political government. To govern well in
the liberal mode, one has to work with and through the mechanisms of
self-sustaining civil society, including its self-regulating economic
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mechanisms. 8 In theory at least, classical liberalism relied heavily on the
writers of the Scottish Enlightenment, especially Adam Ferguson and
Adam Smith, and their conception of the 'naturalness' of civil society
and self-regulating markets.9
The distinctive feature of liberal rationalities is the treatment of the
governed no longer as the objects of rule, but as formally free
subjectivities to be engaged with and coordinated. The governed must
become complicit in the processes whereby they are gove"'ned. Their
formally free decision-making then constitutes not an obstacle to
government, but a technical requirement of it. The effectiveness of
government thus lies in how the 'free' subjectivities in question are
moulded so as to reliably respond to the usual desiderata of government
- the constants of security and prosperity (Hindess, 1996:123-131;
Gordon, 1991:14-27; Burchall, 1991; Barry et aI, 1996:7-16). In this
problematic, the fence less, ambiguous frontier between state and civil
society, between public and private organisations, provides room for
manoeuvre for pragmatic practices of government. In their turn, these
practices rely on the effects of disciplinary power in producing citizens
(and civic organisations) with developed, dependable practices of the self
- free but disciplined agents whose choices are calculable for
governmental purposes.
The history of the western NSBs sketched above illustrates the pragmatic
meshing of the government (to adopt Hindess's term for institutions
officially wielding state sovereignty) and formally 'private'
organisations. The practices that the NSBs have increasingly engaged in
since their emergence in the 1920s, not least as standards have become
8 In the last twenty years interest in civil society has rekindled, although often in
revisionist form in which it becomes for the first time a recipe for 'small
government', and excludes the economy: see for example Cohen and Arato, 1992.
For a sounder account of civil society, one that emphasises its historical
dependence on a strong state, see Krygier, 1996.
9 As Karl Polanyj's (1944) classic account shows, the coming of liberal government
to Britain in the first half of the 191h century saw the crucial markets in question -
in land, labour and capital - emerge out of energetic (not to say brutal) laissez-
faire interventionism. Historically speaking, markets like these are artifices, a point
that would become fairly uncontroversial for neo-liberal ideologues of the latter
201h century, such as the Chicago School.
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an essential regulatory mechanism, leave no doubt that they have
exercised the functions of government in the Foucauldian sense. Yet their
credibility rests on their insistence that, as elements of civil society, they
have not 'been part of - and have worked at ann's length from - the
government. They wear their 'non-government' labels with pride.
Nonetheless the intimacy between them and the government is striking.
In most instances the latter established them, at least partially funded
them, and has been well represented on their boards and committees at
all levels. Those belonging to belligerent states during World War 11, as
we have seen, became crucial intruments in the eminently statist
enterprise of waging war, out of which ISO itself arose. In the affairs of
international standards bodies, western non-government NSBs work
intimately with non-western counterparts which are unashamedly anns of
the government in their homelands. A large and growing proportion of
the western NSBs' (and these days ISO's) standards now become
essential components of the government's nonnal regulatory and other
functions, and most NSBs now have a treaty or memorandum of
understanding to put their 'partnership' with the government on a visible,
fonnal footing. And the prospects of any NSB ever manifesting
unresponsiveness to the policy impulses issuing from the government are
more than somewhat remote.
However, what has stimulated interest in transnational organisations in
the last decade, I suggest, is not their engagement with classical liberal
governmentality, but rather with its 'advanced' liberal- or 'neo-liberal' -
successor. IO We should note in passing that its style of rule picks up
most of the organisational aspects of globalisation: the latter may be seen
(among other things) as a neo-liberal project.
The intellectual origins of neo-liberal rationality go back to the mid-20th
century Gennan Ordoliberalen, the postwar writings of Friedrich von
Hayek, and the Chicago School and its derivatives, especially public
choice theory. The fonner contributed the idea that the business
enterprise models the optimal way for individuals and collectivities to
10 Some writers in Foucauldian mode - eg Dean, 1999:149-50 - distinguish between
'neo-liberalism' and 'advanced liberalism'. For my purposes in this paper the
distinction is over-refined, and I willlreat them as contenninous.
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conduct themselves; as we have seen, nation-states today read from this
script in speaking and behaving as if they were corporations. The
Chicago School for its part suggested that all social phenomena and
choices are in reality market-economic ones (Gordon, 1991:41-46;
Burchall, 1996:22-30). The regimes of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald
Reagan put neo-liberalism into practice, and their examples have been
followed, to greater and lesser extents, in many other western countries,
not least Australia.
While neo-liberalism is still recognisably liberal in founding the
activities of government on the formally free (but substantively
disciplined) choices of autonomous agents, it has introduced drastic
changes into how the governed are to be conceptualised and organised, in
order to be reliably complicit in their own government. Unlike classical
liberalism, neo-liberalism no longer seeks to maintain governmental
functions within society; rather it governs without governing society as
such (Rose, 1996:61). As Margaret Thatcher herself announced in 1987,
'there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women,
and there are families.' II For the purposes of neo-liberal rule, society is
reframed as a plethora of 'communities', such as the academic
community, the legal community, and so on. Some of them are
technocratic ones which Ernst Haas (1990, 1992) has conceptualised as
'epistemic communities', and which standardisers exemplify (Jacobsson,
2000).
While the word 'community' picks up resonances of the warm, enfolding
Gemeinschafien of pre-modern times that classical sociology made much
of (Tonnies, [1887] 1988), there is nothing at all either gemeinschafilich
or morally self-sufficient about 'the business community', 'the
accounting community', 'consumers', 'parents', 'retirees' and so forth
that neo-liberal rule conjures forth and builds on.
I1 Interview in Women's Own, quoted in Dean, 1999: 151. As Colin Gordon
(1991 :46) points out, politicians and governments with neo-liberal stock-in-trade
return to liberalism's self-image as a critique ofgovernment, now especially as the
negation of socially oriented government. They thus present themselves as
breaking up a blocked society. one burdened with rigidities and privileges. The
present conservative Australian government exemplifies this pattern, especially in
dismissing all its critics (of whatever stripe) as 'elites'.
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Rather - to borrow tenns coined by Bruno Latour (1986; cf Barry et aI,
1996:11-12) - these 'autonomised' groupings (including these days some
semi-detached state ones) are 'enrolled' to constitute the first points in
the 'relays' whereby governrnental impulses are diffused and 'translated'
into codes of conduct far from official chancelleries. Detailed
infonnation returns to the chancelleries along the same relays according
to prescribed reporting obligations, that is, ritualised self-presentation. In
a variety of institutional fonns, including the now ubiquitous quasi-
autonomous non-governrnent organisations ('quangos'), the
'cornrnunities' in question are enrolled in governrnent by entering into
'partnerships' with the government to fulfil regulatory functions on a
'voluntary' basis, just as the NSBs have done. Once again, liberal
technologies of government rely not on the imposition of rule on objects
of government, but on moulding subjectivities to be responsive to the
desiderata of government, and in this way (and in this sense), to govern
themselves and others in their sphere of influence.
The essence of neo-liberal rule is, then, governing at a distance, to adapt
Latour's (1986; cf Rose, 1996:55-56) notion of 'action-at-a-distance'.
From its inception in the mid-19th century, telegraphy played a vital role
in western (not least intercontinental imperial) governrnent in relaying
directives to its operatives manning far-flung outposts, and relaying
detailed infonnation about the governed back to the centre. This
'telegraphic politics' (Barry, 1996:129-132) foreboded (and provides a
metaphor for) today's ventriloquistic neo-liberal rule. In place of Morse
code, however, there is another process of encryption or translation: in
Nikolas Rose's (1996:42) words, 'the translation of politic'a1programmes
articulated in rather general tenns - national efficiency, democracy,
equality, enterprise - into ways of seeking to exercise authority over
persons, places, and activities in specific locales and practices'.
The vagueness of these political programs militates against translation
into substantive tenns, as the emergence of 'quality' as a management.
concept (and crusade) over the last three decades, referred to above,
illustrates. Kevin Foley and his colleagues (Foley et ai, 1997:esp 56-57;
Foley et ai, 2005) have rued its vagueness and lack of support in rigorous
management theory; Michael Power (1999:58-59) points to its chronic
(but functional) ambiguity; and Johan Quist (2003) shows it to be in need
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of yet another round of 'translation' if it is to make any difference in
practice at the point of production. 12 However, the true significance of
the quality industry may not lie in producing better products and services
and environmental protection, but in elaborating 'practices of the self for
all organisations it touches (including universities). In so doing it
provides an occasion for recurring auditable self-presentation - an
essential technology of neo-liberal rule.
As Power (1999:42) notes, the rise of quality management in particular,
and its diffusion into many aspects of public and private organisational
life, constitute one of the main factors actually driving the audit
explosion. Quality has to be made auditable, which focuses attention on
the formalities of managerial processes rather than the substance of what
they do (Power, 1999:58-60).
Audit, of course, has its own genealogy within the rationalities of
government discussed above. It begins with the practice of neo-stoicist
confession in 'the shepherd-flock game', and passes through the
inspection-house scenario of disciplinary society. It has long been part of
the civil service tradition in many western countries in what Foucault
calls 'the disciplinarisation of the state' (quoted in Gordon, 1991:27).
With the arrival of audit society, discipline and inspectability come to
play an important part in government well beyond the confines of the
state.
Like the earlier forms of submission to the authoritative gaze, and like
the notion of quality, the concept of audit is singularly vague and
question-begging, which enhances the auditor's power, including the
discretion to liberally interpret public policy (Power, 1999:ch.3).13 Thus
the perennial liberal rhetoric ofsmall government by no means betokens
governing less or abandonment of the will to govern (Rose, 1996:53).
12 A prominent Australian standardiser, lan Stewan, noted as early as 1970 that
'''Quality'' is of course a question-begging word' (quoted in Higgins, 2005a: 136).
The ISO 9000 standards make a virtue of being 'generic', and so applicable in a
wide range oforganisational sellings, which meall/i they have to be highly abstract.
13 '[I]t is precisely this fuzziness in the idea of auditing that enables its migration and
imponation into a wide variety of organizational contexts,' Power (1999:6)
comments. 'The ambiguity of auditing is not a methodological problem but a
substantive fact.'
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Audit society promotes - in terms of Michael Power's (1999) subtitle -
rituals of verification, which also amount to rituals of obeisance for
formally autonomised but effectively enrolled organisations. Hype
notwithstanding, audits make no contribution to transparency in aid of
democratic processes, and are more likely to foreclose questioning than
stimulate it (Power, 1999:138, 143).
One of the immediate gains of the neo-liberal breakthrough in many
western countries in the 1980s was the piecemeal dismantling of direct
state provision of social services, and the commercialisation and
outsourcing of what was left of social provision, under the guise of the
New Public Management (NPM, as it is called in Britain). Direct chains
of command gave way to a new set of arms-length linkages based on
marketisation, monetarisation and contractualism (Rose, 1996:54-55;
Yeatman, 1998; Nordstrom, 2004:14-16). In this shift, substantive social
goals - such as the reduction in poverty and morbidity levels - gave way
to formal financial 'outcomes', above all 'cost effectiveness' and 'value
for money'.
At the same time, neo-liberal governments replaced (wherever possible)
direct economic regulation with various forms of self-regulation based on
formal reporting requirements. Both shifts encouraged a new form of
corporate 'governance' (a term that also took off in the 1990s) backed up
by auditing, the criteria for which came from standards and other rules,
such as the Cadbury Code in the UK. These transformations in particular
exemplify the neo-liberal focus on government at a distance. Through
their reliance on auditing, they also have serious ramifications for the
goals and forms of organisational life.
The organisational effects of government by audit follow the logic of the
barium meal - the ingestion of something hardly nutritious and certainly
not appetising, but visible to the penetrating diagnostic gaze. Since the
favourable outcome of an audit (not least a quality audit) constitutes the
hallmark of legitimacy and, for a commercial(ised) organisation, a
competitive advantage, it can displace substantive goals in the
organisation's forms of calculation. The way to the prize here lies
through achieving auditability by inserting internal control systems into
the organisation. As Power (1999:53) observes:
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The growing formalization of regulatory layers has generated
interest in the internalization of control mechanisms and the
validation of their integrity by internal and external audits. New
roles have been created, such as fmancial services compliance
officers... and environmental managers ... , and new institutional
stages have been provided for old roles, such as internal auditors
who are an increasingly credible point of reference in public
debate. Furthermore there has also been a reworking of
inspectorial institutions. With enhanced managerial capability
has come greater attention to systems of self-inspection.
To be auditable, then, is to be visible to remote governors and so
governable at a distance, rather than to be efficiently pursuing the
substantive goals of the organisation. 'Audit can provide assurance that
the system works well even when substantive performance is poor'
(Power, 1999:60).
Audit society represents another triumph of formal over substantive
rationality (Higgins and Clegg, 1988). The present-day 'rule explosion'
is one indicator of this triumph. And. true to the spirit of neo-liberal
marketisation, as we've seen, there now flourishes a market in rules. The
oft-remarked trend towards the replacement of the 'hard' laws of
sovereign states with the 'soft' standards, norms and rules of
transnational bodies, fits the ventriloquistic pattern of neo-liberal rule at a
distance.
As we have seen, too, all rationalities of government cultivate strands of
supportive expertise that reflect their particular logics. Whereas socially-
oriented government, that immediately preceded the neo-liberal
breakthrough, privileged substantive, social-scientific expertise, not least
in policy formation, today's government rests on mastery of formal
rationality as embodied in the intellectually lowlier 'grey sciences',
above all accounting, auditing and law (Rose, 1996:55-56). T:le self-
evident goal of government is now simply more 'transparent', cost-
effective government for its own sake, not government that achieves
democratically chosen normative goals.
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Political Conclusion
Much is to be gained from situating the peculiarities of today's global
governance in a wider historical context such as the Foucauldian one.
This strategy 'robs globalisation and its apologetics of their strangeness,
and brings them into a more familiar terrain of power analysis - how
power is organised and exercised; the kind of finery the emperor pretends
to be wearing; how dissidence is contained; and what (equally familiar)
effects all this has on our lives in terms of disempowerment and the
frustration of substantive social goals. Those who fight for their own and
others' liberation must first gain a precise knowledge of how their
bondage works, and Foucault's analysis takes us a long way towards that
essential understanding. Rather like his intellectual ancestor,
Machiavelli, he takes a dispassionate view of political doctrines, the
better to understand their role in strategies of domination. Hence his
insistence on seeing neo-liberalism strictly as one item on a menu of
governmental rationalities, not as a political doctrine or program as such.
But at the end of the day we have to cease suspending disbelief and see
neo-liberalism (together with its artefact, globalisation) as precisely a
political project, a profoundly socially destructive one no different from
that classically described by Karl Polanyi (1944) in The great
transformation. In his historical scenario, the attempt to achieve the
corrosive utopia of market society, first in early Victorian England,
provoked an equal and opposite political reaction, which he dubbed 'the
self-protection of society', in the form of various collectivist movements,
including trade unionism, socialism, and eventually even 'social
liberalism' .
Repression notwithstanding, oppositional groups managed to articulate
their arguments and programs to challenge economic liberalism, with
considerable success. A robust political process ensued around normative
issues of democracy, social equity and inclusiveness. When the
protectors of society eventually won the struggle for universal suffrage
and formed governments, they achieved further success in mounting
policies and building institutions that at lel.lst partially achieved
democratically arrived-at goals of social justice and social security.
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The novelty of neo-liberal rule today is its ability to silence political
contestation and hamstring the· political process, leaving society
unprotected. Only neo-liberalism itself achieves articulateness in a
political culture it has itself moulded. To reach for another Thatcherism,
there is no alternative! In countries with pronounced neo-liberal
governments such as USA, Britain and Australia, the official opposition
parrots the same neo-liberal slogans and has no political profile of its
own, let alone a political program around substantive nonnative goals to
protect society. Public affairs have in this way degenerated into an
endless parade of triviality, scandals and moral panics about 'terrorists',
'queue jumpers' and the like (ef Sandel 1996). Democratic will
fonnation as a product of public debate and mobilisation thus tends to
b·ecome a dead letter.
This unchallenged neo-liberal ascendancy, I suggest, is the cumulative
effect of a number of aspects of neo-liberalism's discursive practices of
government. The most obvious of them is the talking-down of the
capacities of nation-states in the putative 'new ballgame' of
globalisation. As nation-states remain virtually the only credible sites for
programs of social amelioration, writing them off (dogmatically, without
evidence) as spent forces strongly discourages the politics of social
amelioration as such, to the point of making them discursively
unavailable. Secondly, the declining relevance of nation-states becomes a
self-fulfilling prophecy once the power to regulate is transferred to
transnational organisations divorced from popular sovereignty and
political community. These organisations are thus available for
regulatory capture, whereby the interests of their most powerful
'stakeholders' mould the regulatory regimes they proliferate.
Thirdly, in organisational life as a whole (including the state), the
shibboleths of fonnal rationality (accountability, transparency, value for
money and so on), and their enervating rituals of self-presentation and
verification, effectively decoy discussion of - and mobilisation around -
substantive issues and choices about how we might imagine ourselves
living and working together and relating to each other, given the
technological means at our disposal and the environmental dangers we
face.
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To these factors we might add a fourth, to which George Ritzer (2004)
draws our attention. He points to globalisation's tendency to dehumanise
and obliterate the distinctive features of products, amenities, services and
- above all - social forms. In short, .nothing' (social forms that are
centrally ·conceived and controlled, and lack substantive local content
and control) displaces 'something' (social forms with local content,
under local control, and with substantive content). Our political life itself
has fallen victim to this Zeitgeist of globalisation, to itself become
homogenised, flattened and denatured.
In political theory at least, the western tradition has contained two
antithetical senses of freedom - the ancient civic-republican conception
of freedom as collective self-rule, and the liberal conception of the
propertied individual's freedom from authoritative interference. Freedom
to pursue deliberatively arrived at goals, versus freedom from the
decisions of others (most particularly democratic governments). The
sympathies of many of us may go to today's reactive anti-globalisation
movements. But it would be far better for us to find our starting points in
reaffirmed republican freedom against its neo-liberal denial, work out
our substantive goals, and devise the political forms in which to mobilise
around them. Those forms would have to be resilient enough to challenge
the supports of globalised neo-liberal rule that stand in the way of
effective democratic government.
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